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[L. A. No. 19154. In Bank. Mar. 30, 1945.]

SAM. R. MOSLEY, Respondent, v. AI·mEN FARMS
PANY (a Corporation), Appellant.

CO~I·

[la, Ib] Streets - Injuries Caused by Obstructions - EvidenceSufficiency.-In a city employee's action against a milk company for injuries resulting from being thrown to the sidewalk
when his mowing machine collided with milk crates which
were hidden by weeds between the sidewalk and the property
line, the evidence sustained a finding that defendant was negligent in piling the crates on a parking near the sidewalk and
in leaving them unguarded and unattended for at least a
month, where the crates which caused the accident were
directly across the sidewalk from the. piled crates, and the
court was justified in deciding that defendant should have
anticipated or foreseen that the crates might become scattered.
[2] Negligence-Knowledge of Danger.-One test for determining
the issue of negligence is whether a person of ordinary prudence should have foreseen or anticipated that someone might
be injured by his action or nonaction.
[8] Id. - Questions of Law and F&et - Exercise of Oare. - An.
actor'!; conduct must always be gauged in relation to all the
other material circumstances surrounding it, and if such other
circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whether the
questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds of ordinary care, such doubt must be resolved as a matter of fact
rather than of law.
[4] Id. - Proximate Cause - Intervening Causes.-An intervening
agency does not break the chain of causation where what
occurred was reasonably foreseeable and should have been
anticipated.
(5) Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Proximate Cause.-The issue
of proximate cause is essentially one of fact.
[6] Id. - Proximate Cause - Intervening Oauses.-An intervening
agency· will not always relieve a defendant of responsibility
for an injury. (Overruling Schwa,.t. v. Oalifo,.nia Gas If Elec-

/

[2] See 19 Oal.Jur. 563, 583; 38 Am.Jur. 678.
[3] See 19 Cal.Jm. 719, 723; 38 Am.Jur. 1041.
[5] See 19 Ca1.Jur. 732; 38 Am.Jur. 1056.
McX. Dig. References: [11 Streets, §!JO; [2] Negligenee, §25;
[3] Negligence, § 150; [4, 6) Negligence, § 16; (5) Negligence,
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'ric Corp.) 163 Cal. 398, 12!i P. 1044, and disnpl'),()\"jng of
Solomon 11. Red flit"", Lllm 1ler Co" 56 CnI.Ap!'. 7-4:!, 20(i P. 4!)8,
and Royal Insurance Co. 11. Mazzei, 50 Cal.App.2d 54!), ]2:1 P.
2d 586, in so far as they approve thl' Schwartz casp.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
San Diego County. Robert B. Burch, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.
Monroe & McInnis for Appellant.
Johnson & Johnson, E. L. Johnson and C. Ashley Johnson for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment awarding damages to plaintiff for personal injuries suffered in a
fall when he was dislodged from a tractor which collided
with some milk crates owned by defendant. The case was
tried before the court without a jury.
The injury occurred in National City on Highland Avenue,
a north-south street about 25 feet south of its intersection
with 10th Street, an east-west street. Highland A venue is a
paved street. There is a curb along the west side thereof.
Adjacent to the curb on the west and parallel therewith is an
unpaved strip 8% feet wide, which is commonly called the
parking. Next to the parking is a 5-foot paved sidewalk.
Along the west side of the paved sidewalk and between it and
the property line there is a 2-foot unpaved strip. The lot
fronting on Highland Avenue at the point in question is vacant. A school ground is located on the west side of Highland
A venue commencing at the northwest corner of the intersection of Highland and 10th Street and extending north for a
block. A tree stands in the parking about 25 feet south of
10th Street. There is considerable traffic on the sidewalk
on Highland Avenue.
Defendant for a' year prior to the accident had been in the
retail milk business in National City, and during the course
thereof, its employees, without authority or right, piled milk
crates containing empty milk bottles on the parking about
three feet south of the tree. About a month prior to the accident defendant ceased to do business in National City, leaving
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about eighteen crates Unattended and unguarded at the ahoyc
mentioned place. The crates were about 2 feet 10llg by 11/.l
feet wide by 12 to 14 inches high, and were usually stacked
3 or 4 high. The 2-foot strip adjacent to the sidewalk was
grown up with weeds and wild oats to a height of 2% to 3 feet.
Some time prior to the accident, according to the findings of
the trial court, two of the crates became "displaced, and
hidden in the aforesaid growth of weeds in the space between
the cement walk and the property line and across the five foot
pavement from where the' pile of the defendant's crates was kept and stacked. It is not in evidence that any agent of
defendant moved said boxes." The two crates were directly
across the sidewalk from the main pile 011 the parking. Prior
to the accident one of defendant's drivers had seen glass from
broken bottles on the 2-foot strip or nearby.
The court also found that plaintiff, an employee of National
City, while engaged in mowing the weeds along Highland
Avenue at the direction of his employer, and using a tractor
therefor, drove in a northerly direction "on the cement walk,
and at times to put the left wheels of this rubber tired tractor
over into the aforesaid two foot space; it is true that while so
operating said tractor, plaintiff, in order to avoid the pile
of boxes or crates. operated and ran the aforesaid tractor
upon one or more of the boxes so hidden in the aforesaid
two foot space, and that thereby the aforesaid tractor was
suddenly, and without warning, lifted from the ground and
tilted at an angle which caused plaintiff to lose his balance,
fall from the seat of said tractor and strike his head upon
the aforesaid cement pavement."
National City has an ordinance reading "An ordinance
prohibiting the displaying for sale, offering for sale, or selling
of goods, wares or merchandise of any kind upon any public
street or alley within the City of National City, California,
and prohibiting the obstruction of any street or alley, or portion thereof, or the sidewalk's face thereof, within said City,
by placing '01' permitting thereon any signs, boxes, or other
thing or article which will in any way obstruct or hinder the
use thereof or travel thereon within the limits of said City."
The court found that defendant violated the ordinance; that
the maintenance by' defendant of the pile of crates constituted
a nuisance; and that defendant negligently left the crates
on the parking and proximately caused the injury to plaintiff.
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Defendant concedes it had no right to place the crates on
the parking and that it was a trespass and probably negligcnce
to do so, but it urges, that the acts and omissions on its part
were not the proximate canse of the accident becanse the
trial court found that it did not move the two crates which
caused the accident to the two-foot strip and it is unknown
how they got there; that if some independent intervening
agency caused them to reach that place defendant is not liablc
for the reason that the chain of causation was broken; and
that the maintenance by it of the pile of crates on the parking
was not a nuisance or a violation of the ordinance.
[la] Disregarding the ordinance and the finding by the
court of the existence of a nuisance. the trial court was justified in concluding that the defendant wa!< ne~ligent and that
such negligence was the proximate (,:ln8e of the accident.
Leaving those crates on the parking for a month or more
unguarded, unattended and not properly inspected would be
such conduct 8..<; would justify 8. finding of negligence by the
trier of fact. Under the circumstances here presented the
question of negligence and legal or proximate cause are
closely related, assuming the test for both is whether a man
of ordinary prudence should have foreseen or anticipated that
the two crates might reach the spot where they were located
on the two-foot strip. (See Prosser on Torts, pp. 364 et seq.)
[2] It is well settled that one test for determining the issue
of nt!gligence is whether a person of ordinary prudence should
have foreseen or anticipated that someone might be injured by
llis action or nonaction. (19 Cal.Jur. 583, 563-4; 1 Shearman
& Redfield on Negligence, § 24.) Or as stated in different
terms: "Negligent conduct may be either: (a) an act which
the actor as a reasonable man should realize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of
another; or, (b) 8 failure to do an act which is necessary for
the protection or assistance of another and which th2 actor
is under a duty to do." (Rest., Torts, § 284.) And "The
actor should recognize that his conduct in,ol,es 8 risk ot.
~ausing an invasion of another's interest. if a person, (8) possessing such perception of the surrounding circumstances as
a reasonable man would have, ot' lffich superior perception
I.I.S the actor himself has, and (b) possessing such knowledge
oJ other pertinent matters as a reasonable man would have
of such superior knowledge as the actor himseli has, and
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(c) correlating such perception and knowledge with reasonable intelligence and judgment would infer that the act creates an appreciable chance of causing such invasion." (Rest.,
Torts, § 289.) The actor is bound to know "the qualities and
habits of human beings and animals and the qualities. charllctcristics and capacities of things and forces in so far as
they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in
the community." (Rest., Torts, § 290.)
[3] Whether or not the test has been met is generally
one of fact for the trier of fact. .As recently expressed
by this court:
"In other words, the actor's conduct' must always be
gauged in relation to all the other material circumstances
surrounding it and if such other circumstances admit of.
a reasonable doubt as to whether such questioned conduct
falls within or without the bounds of ordinary care then
such doubt must be resolved as a matter of fact rather
than of law." (Toschi v. Christian, 24 Ca1.2d 354, 360
[149 P.2d 848].) (See, also, 19 Cal.Jur. 719, 723.)
[lb] Looking at the circumstances in the ease at bar, we
finel crates piled three or four high on a parking near a sidewalk without right or authority, and left there for at least a
month without regard to the condition of the pile. The sidewalk has considerable pedestrian traffic upon it. There is a
school ground nearby. The two crates which caused the acddent were directly across the sidewalk from the pile of crates,
only five or six feet away. Under those circumstances we
cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court was not justified in deciding that defendant as a person of ordinary prudence should have anticipated or foreseen that the crates
might become scattered, that some might fall off of the pile
during the course of time, and possibly on the sidewalk, from
whence a passerby might naturally push them aside to their
ultimate resting place, or that they might be moved by school
children. Presumably defendant's delivery man knew of the
presence of the school, having served the community for some
time. The. evidence shows that one of defendant's employees
saw glass along the two-foot strip which would indicate that
the crates or the contents had been tampered with. If defendant had used due care and inspected the pile of crates or
removed it (it having left them there for over a month), the
two displaced crates probably would have been discovered.
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When the crates became scattered and hidden in the weeds
they would be a danger to anyone lawfully using the area.
[4] Viewing the issue as one of proximate or legal cause,
and conceding there was some intervening agency in the chain .\
of causation, such agency was not a supersesding one exonerating defendant, because, as we have seen, what occurred was
reasonably forseeable, and should haye been anticipated.
Certainly, when that is tru~ the intervening agency does
not break the chain of causation. The consequences of defendant's act were natural and probable. In Katz v. Helbing,
215 Cal. 449 [10 P.2d 1001], defendant, a contraetor engaging in erecting a structure on a city lot, pursuant to a
permit from the city, placed a box of lime partly on the
sidewalk and partly on the street. Two boys playing with
the lime. threw some of it at a passing streetcar injuring
the plaintiff who was a passenger thereon. Judgment for
plaintiff was affirmed, this court stating at page 451:
"This practice [placing building materials in the street],
under ordinary circumstances, is recognized as lawful by custom and judicial decision. But if experience had demonstrated
that the placing of building materials in public streets and
sidewalks was likely to be attended by accidents to persons
lawfully using said streets and sidewalks, whether by virtue
of wrongful acts of interference of young chadren or otherwise, we might expect to find the matter regulated by statute.
and in the absence of statutory prohibitions it would be the
duty of courts and juries to declare such conduct wrongful if
a reasonably prudent man would have foreseen that injury
would probably result, for the acts of a defendant are deemed
the proximate cause of such consequences as a reasonably prudent man would anticipate as likely to result therefrom. . . .
Intervening wrongful acts of third persons, but for which
injuries complained of would not have been received, ordinarily break the chain of causation, because they are not to
be anticipated as probable consequences, but are occasional
and exceptional results. But this is not always the case,
especially where the acts of children of a nonresponsible
age are involved. . . .
"Tested by these principles, we think the record sufficiently
supports the jury's verdict against the defendants. The box
containing the lime was on the sidewalk and street, unguarded
and practically' uncovered. There were no warning signs on
or near it, and there was no watchman at the building. . ••
"In our opiri.ion, however, it is not essential to the liability
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of any of the defendants that they have had actual knowledge
of the activitie~ of the children. We think there is no douht
that the conduct of the parties who were responsible for allowing this highly dangerous material t.o remain on the sidewalk
uncovered, unguarded, and with no precautions t.aken to prevent injury to members of the public, was negligent. We
think it may also be said that the box with its material was
attractive to small boys, and that defendantf< were charged
with notice of the possibility of boys being allured by it and
using it in a manner dangerous to others. Even if defendants
knew nothing of the actl' of the children in the instant case
they should have known, both from general experience and
from the fact that the children had played with the material
for days prior to the accident. Under all of the circumstances
the jury might certain'ly find, as may be implied from the verdict, that the <'onsequences in this case Rhould have been foreseen." (Emphasis added.) (See, also, Merrill v. Los Angeles
Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499 [111 P. 534, 139 Am.St.Rep.
135, 31 L.R.A.N.S. 559]; Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal.App.
597 [161 P. 29]; Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87; Stasulat v.
Pacific Gas &- Electnc Co., 8 Cal.2d 631 r67 P.2d 678]; ReRt.,
Torts, §§447-9, 452.) It has been tersely st.ated that:
"If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act
in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazard:;;
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does Dot
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."
(Rest., Torts, § 449.) It has been held that the rules on the
subject in the Re:;;tatement of Torts, sections 442-453, are
applicable in thi:;; state. (Stasulat v. Pacific Gas &- Electric
Co., 8 Cal.2d 631 [67 P.2d 678].)
[6] Finally, the issue of proximate cause is essentially
one of fact. (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas &- Electric Co., 20
Ca1.2d 141 [124 P.2d 51]; 19 Ca1.Jur. 732-3.)
[6] Particular reliance is placed by defendant upon
Schwartz v. California Gas &- Electric Corp., 163 Cal. 398
[125 P. 1044], where defendant negligently dropped an insulator .on plaintiff's land and the latter's horse was injured
when he came in contact with it. The court reversed a judgment for plaintiff on the ground of an alleged erroneous instruction. The opinion contains the erroneous statement that:
" 'an injury is not actionable which would not have resulted
from the act of negligence, except for the interposition of an
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independent cause.''' (P. 402.) Vlhile there are distingUishing factors in the case at bar, the Schwartz case is
out of harmony with the rules heretofore stated. It is not
always true that an intervening agency will relieve defendant of responsibility. For that renson it must be o\'erruled. Likewise, Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal.
App. 742 [206 P. 498); and Royal Ins. Co. v. Mazzei, 50
CaJ.App.2d 549 [123 P.2d 586], are distinguishable, but
appear to approve the rule in the Schwartz case. In that
respect they are disapproved.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
TRAYNOR, J .-1 concur in the judgment. It is my opinion
that defendant's liability depends entirely upon whether it
violated a duty of protecting the plaintiff from unreasonable
risk of harm (See, Restatement: Torts, § 282) and that consideration of the case in terms of proximate cause obscures
the real issue. Moreover, I do not believe that "the issue
of proximate cause is ordinarily one of fact."
That plaintiff's harm was in fact caused by defendant's
conduct there can be no doubt. Whatever the means by which
the milk crates were moved from one place to the other, defendant's leaving them in the parking was a substantial factor
in bringing about the harm. (See, Restatement: Torts, § 431.)
With that determined, the question of causation is settled.
It remains to determine only whether the harm falls within
the limits of defendant's legal responsibility for the consequences of its conduct. In my opinion that determination is
made once it is established that defendant's conduct was or
was not wrongful with respect to the plaintiff; for the risk
reasonably to be foreseen not only creates the liability but defines its limits. (Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y.
339,344,346 [162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253] ; Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N.H. 268, 276 [133 A. 4, 46 A.L.R. 380] ; see,
Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co. [1921], 3 K.B. 560; Green,
The Rationale of Proximate Cause, pp. 88, 118; Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and The Law of Torts, 52 Harv.L.Rev. 372,
381-390; Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat
from "Rationalization," 6 U. of Chic. L.Rev. 36.)
It must be reeognized, however, that the question of legal
responsibility iI commonly considered in terms of "proximate
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cause," wl;ieh is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of
ell.wmtioll, but with the various considerations of policy that
limit an aeto/s responsibility for the consequence..,; of his con·
duct. (Sec, Prosser, Torts, pp. 311-313.) Although the dor·
trineor proximate cause is ilesigned to fix tile limitations upon
liability, it has not yet been so formulated as to have a fair
degree of predictability in its application in marking the
boundary between liability and nonliahility. The vag'lCness
of the doctrine has been candidly admitted in the dissenting
opinion of Judge Andrews in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R.
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 [162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253]; "A
cause but not the proximate cause. What we do mean by the
word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public
policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not
logic. It is practical polities." It may well be that any case
can be analyzed more clearly without applying the doctrine
of "proximate cause." (See, Green, Merlov. Public Service
Company-A Study in Proximate Cause, 37 m.L.Rev. 429~)
In any event, application of the doctrine to cases like the present one only leads to confusion, for the considerations that
determine whether a defendant was negligent with respect to
a plaintiff define the limits of his responsibility. "Almost
inyariably these cases present no issue of causation in fact.
~;ince the defendant has created a situation acted upon byanother force to bring about the result; and to deal with them
hl terms of 'proximate cause' is only to avoid the real issue.
The question is one of negligence and the extent of the obligation: whether the defendant's responsibility extends to such
interventions, which are foreign to the risk he has created. It
might be stated as a problem of duti to protect the plaintiff
against such an intervening cause. A decision that the defendant's conduct is not the 'proximate cause' of the result
means only that he has not been negligent at all, or that
his negligence, if any, does not cover such a risk." (Prosser, Torts, p. 367; Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., sup raj
Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F.2d 767, 770; Waube
v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613 [258 N.W. 497, 98 A.L.R.
394]; BourhiLl v. Young [1942], 2 All Eng.Rep. 396; Dulieu v. White &. Sons [1901], 2 K.B. 669, 685.)
When defendant in the present case left its crates unattended on the parking, it created an unreasonable risk that
they would be 'Scattered and result in harm to persons whose
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passage they obstructed. The risk reasonably to be foreseen
included the possibility that the crates, left readil y accessible to the pasRing crowd day after day, would be moved
about and become a hazard to persons not only on the street
and sidewalk but on the other property in the vicinity of the
parking. "The kind of harm which in fact happened might
have been expected, though the precise manner in which it
happened was determined by an extraneous accident. " (Pollock, Law of Torts (9th ed.) , pp. 50-51; Stasulat v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., 8 Ca1.2d 631, 637-638 [67 P.2d 678];
Reithard~ v. Board of Education, 43 Cal.App.2d 629, 635 [111
P.2d 440] ; Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass.
501, 517 [167 N.E. 235]; see, Bohlen, Studies In The Law
of Torts, p. 8.) It is immaterial that an intervening force
moved the crates and brought about the result, for defendant's responsibility extended to such intervention. The possibility that third persons would move the crates was not so
remote that it could not be regarded as part of the risk. Defendant 's negligence consisted in failing to protect plaintiff
against that risk. (See, Prosser, Torts, pp. 355-357; Katz v.
Helbing, 205 Cal. 629 [271 P. 1062, 62 A.L.R. 825]; Merrill
v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499, 505 [111 P.
534, 139 Am.St.Rep. 135, 31 L.R.A.N.S. 559]; Nason v. LordMerrow Excelsior Co., 92 N.H. 251, 253 [29 A.2d 464]; Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., supra, at p. 517; Sycamore Preserve Works v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 366 TIL 11
[7 N.E.2d 740, 111 A.L.R. 1133]; Lawrenceburg v. Lay, 149
Ky. 490 [149 S.W. 862, Ann.Cas. 1914A, 1194, 42 L.R.A.N.S.
480] ; Shanley v. Hurley, 96 Vt. 119 [117 A. 250, 23 A.L.R.
261]; cf. Stultz v. Benson uumber Co., 6 Cal.2d 688, 695 [59
P.2d 100]; see, Restatement, Torts, § 302, comment (I),
§§ 447-449, 452 ; 25 Cal.L.Rev. 247; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence,
§ 70.) This course of reasoning departs from the accustomed
one only because of the continuing confusion engendered by
the doctrine of proximate cause. No rules of property are
disturbed; this field of law is not one in which people enter
into transactions in reliance on past decisions. In all probability the general expectation is the reasonable one that in
time the courts will dispel the mists that have settled on the
doctrine of proximate cause in the field of negligence.
If, however, the extent of defendant's liability is determined in terms of "proximate cause" it should be recognized
that the issue presented is one of law. Whether a defendant's

"

Mar,]9.J!lJ

)'

~Io::;LEY I', AnDE;\ FARMS CO,
[26 C,2d 213; 157 P,2d 372J

223

conduct is an actual cause of a pJaint.iff's harm is a question
of fact, but the exiHtellcc and extcnt of a defendant's liability
preHcnts a qucstion of law. (Sec, Restatement, Torts, § 453.)
The diHtinction is important in determining the respective
functions of court and jury and the scope of review by an
appellate court. Ordinarily, the jury decides questions of
fact and the court questions of law, but there are sometimes
variations. (See, Thayer, Preliminary Tl'eatise on Evidence
At The Common Law, pp, 185, 202; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d
ed.), p. 500,) With respect to questions of fact the court
reserves the power of deciding whether an issue should be
presented to the jury: if reasonable men could not differ as
to whether the evidence does or does not establish the existence of a fact, the court will not submit the issue to the jury.
The determination of the standard of reasonable conduct by
which a defendant's conduct is to be measured involves a
question of law, a determination whether or not liability
should be imposed, This question is nevertheless commonly
left to the jury, although sometimes the formulation of th~
standard of reasonable conduct is taken over by an appellat(J
court or provided for by legislation. (See, Clinkscales v.
Carver, 22 Ca1.2d 72 [136 P.2d 777]; Sioux City & Pacific R.
Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall (84 U.S.) 657, 664 [21 L.Ed. 745];
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417 [12 S.Ct. 679,
36 L.Ed. 485); Restatement, Torts, § 285; Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 120-129; Holmes, Law in Science and Science in
Law, 12 Harv.L.Rev. 443, 457.) In so far as the issue of "proximate cause" is concerned with the existence of a duty or
with limitations imposed upon liability as a matter of public
policy, the issue is for the court. In so far as it is concerned
with the foreseeability of the particular risk or the reasonableness of defendant's conduct with respect thereto in doubtful cases, the issue is for the jury in the absence of standards
imposed by the Legislature or an appellate court. (See, Restatement, Torts, § 453; Prosser, Torts, pp. 373-375; Stasulat
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 8 Cal.2d 631,638 [67 P.2d 678].)
Eilinonds,

j,.

J., concurred.

